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outside.go
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outside.go
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package nebula
import (
"encoding/binary"
"github.com/flynn/noise"
"github.com/golang/protobuf/proto"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
// "github.com/google/gopacket"
// "github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
// "encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"time"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv4"
)
const (
minFwPacketLen = 4
)
func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(addr *udpAddr, out []byte, packet []byte, header *Header, fwPacket *FirewallPacket, nb []byte) {
err := header.Parse(packet)
if err != nil {
// TODO: best if we return this and let caller log
// TODO: Might be better to send the literal []byte("holepunch") packet and ignore that?
// Hole punch packets are 0 or 1 byte big, so lets ignore printing those errors
if len(packet) > 1 {
l.WithField("packet", packet).Infof("Error while parsing inbound packet from %s: %s", addr, err)
}
return
}
//l.Error("in packet ", header, packet[HeaderLen:])
// verify if we've seen this index before, otherwise respond to the handshake initiation
hostinfo, err := f.hostMap.QueryIndex(header.RemoteIndex)
var ci *ConnectionState
if err == nil {
ci = hostinfo.ConnectionState
}
switch header.Type {
case message:
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, addr, header) {
return
}
f.decryptToTun(hostinfo, header.MessageCounter, out, packet, fwPacket, nb)
// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
case lightHouse:
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, addr, header) {
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, header.MessageCounter, out, packet, header, nb)
if err != nil {
l.WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", addr).WithField("vpnIp", IntIp(hostinfo.hostId)).
WithField("packet", packet).
Error("Failed to decrypt lighthouse packet")
//TODO: maybe after build 64 is out? 06/14/2018 - NB
//f.sendRecvError(net.Addr(addr), header.RemoteIndex)
return
}
f.lightHouse.HandleRequest(addr, hostinfo.hostId, d, hostinfo.GetCert(), f)
// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
case test:
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, addr, header) {
return
}
d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, header.MessageCounter, out, packet, header, nb)
if err != nil {
l.WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", addr).WithField("vpnIp", IntIp(hostinfo.hostId)).
WithField("packet", packet).
Error("Failed to decrypt test packet")
//TODO: maybe after build 64 is out? 06/14/2018 - NB
//f.sendRecvError(net.Addr(addr), header.RemoteIndex)
return
}
if header.Subtype == testRequest {
// This testRequest might be from TryPromoteBest, so we should roam
// to the new IP address before responding
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, addr)
f.send(test, testReply, ci, hostinfo, hostinfo.remote, d, nb, out)
}
// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
// Non encrypted messages below here, they should not fall through to avoid tracking incoming traffic since they
// are unauthenticated
case handshake:
HandleIncomingHandshake(f, addr, packet, header, hostinfo)
return
case recvError:
// TODO: Remove this with recv_error deprecation
f.handleRecvError(addr, header)
return
case closeTunnel:
if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, addr, header) {
return
}
l.WithField("vpnIp", IntIp(hostinfo.hostId)).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
Info("Close tunnel received, tearing down.")
f.closeTunnel(hostinfo)
return
default:
l.Debugf("Unexpected packet received from %s", addr)
return
}
f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, addr)
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo.hostId)
}
func (f *Interface) closeTunnel(hostInfo *HostInfo) {
//TODO: this would be better as a single function in ConnectionManager that handled locks appropriately
f.connectionManager.ClearIP(hostInfo.hostId)
f.connectionManager.ClearPendingDeletion(hostInfo.hostId)
f.lightHouse.DeleteVpnIP(hostInfo.hostId)
f.hostMap.DeleteVpnIP(hostInfo.hostId)
f.hostMap.DeleteIndex(hostInfo.localIndexId)
}
func (f *Interface) handleHostRoaming(hostinfo *HostInfo, addr *udpAddr) {
if hostDidRoam(hostinfo.remote, addr) {
if !hostinfo.lastRoam.IsZero() && addr.Equals(hostinfo.lastRoamRemote) && time.Since(hostinfo.lastRoam) < RoamingSupressSeconds*time.Second {
if l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
l.WithField("vpnIp", IntIp(hostinfo.hostId)).WithField("udpAddr", hostinfo.remote).WithField("newAddr", addr).
Debugf("Supressing roam back to previous remote for %d seconds", RoamingSupressSeconds)
}
return
}
l.WithField("vpnIp", IntIp(hostinfo.hostId)).WithField("udpAddr", hostinfo.remote).WithField("newAddr", addr).
Info("Host roamed to new udp ip/port.")
hostinfo.lastRoam = time.Now()
remoteCopy := *hostinfo.remote
hostinfo.lastRoamRemote = &remoteCopy
hostinfo.SetRemote(*addr)
if f.lightHouse.amLighthouse {
f.lightHouse.AddRemote(hostinfo.hostId, addr, false)
}
}
}
func (f *Interface) handleEncrypted(ci *ConnectionState, addr *udpAddr, header *Header) bool {
// If connectionstate exists and the replay protector allows, process packet
// Else, send recv errors for 300 seconds after a restart to allow fast reconnection.
if ci == nil || !ci.window.Check(header.MessageCounter) {
f.sendRecvError(addr, header.RemoteIndex)
return false
}
return true
}
// newPacket validates and parses the interesting bits for the firewall out of the ip and sub protocol headers
func newPacket(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *FirewallPacket) error {
// Do we at least have an ipv4 header worth of data?
if len(data) < ipv4.HeaderLen {
return fmt.Errorf("packet is less than %v bytes", ipv4.HeaderLen)
}
// Is it an ipv4 packet?
if int((data[0]>>4)&0x0f) != 4 {
return fmt.Errorf("packet is not ipv4, type: %v", int((data[0]>>4)&0x0f))
}
// Adjust our start position based on the advertised ip header length
ihl := int(data[0]&0x0f) << 2
// Well formed ip header length?
if ihl < ipv4.HeaderLen {
return fmt.Errorf("packet had an invalid header length: %v", ihl)
}
// Check if this is the second or further fragment of a fragmented packet.
flagsfrags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[6:8])
fp.Fragment = (flagsfrags & 0x1FFF) != 0
// Firewall handles protocol checks
fp.Protocol = data[9]
// Accounting for a variable header length, do we have enough data for our src/dst tuples?
minLen := ihl
if !fp.Fragment && fp.Protocol != fwProtoICMP {
minLen += minFwPacketLen
}
if len(data) < minLen {
return fmt.Errorf("packet is less than %v bytes, ip header len: %v", minLen, ihl)
}
// Firewall packets are locally oriented
if incoming {
fp.RemoteIP = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[12:16])
fp.LocalIP = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[16:20])
if fp.Fragment || fp.Protocol == fwProtoICMP {
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
} else {
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl : ihl+2])
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl+2 : ihl+4])
}
} else {
fp.LocalIP = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[12:16])
fp.RemoteIP = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[16:20])
if fp.Fragment || fp.Protocol == fwProtoICMP {
fp.RemotePort = 0
fp.LocalPort = 0
} else {
fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl : ihl+2])
fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl+2 : ihl+4])
}
}
return nil
}
func (f *Interface) decrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, mc uint64, out []byte, packet []byte, header *Header, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var err error
out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, packet[:HeaderLen], packet[HeaderLen:], mc, nb)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if !hostinfo.ConnectionState.window.Update(mc) {
l.WithField("vpnIp", IntIp(hostinfo.hostId)).WithField("header", header).
Debugln("dropping out of window packet")
return nil, errors.New("out of window packet")
}
return out, nil
}
func (f *Interface) decryptToTun(hostinfo *HostInfo, messageCounter uint64, out []byte, packet []byte, fwPacket *FirewallPacket, nb []byte) {
var err error
out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, packet[:HeaderLen], packet[HeaderLen:], messageCounter, nb)
if err != nil {
l.WithError(err).WithField("vpnIp", IntIp(hostinfo.hostId)).Error("Failed to decrypt packet")
//TODO: maybe after build 64 is out? 06/14/2018 - NB
//f.sendRecvError(hostinfo.remote, header.RemoteIndex)
return
}
err = newPacket(out, true, fwPacket)
if err != nil {
l.WithError(err).WithField("packet", out).WithField("hostInfo", IntIp(hostinfo.hostId)).
Warnf("Error while validating inbound packet")
return
}
if !hostinfo.ConnectionState.window.Update(messageCounter) {
l.WithField("vpnIp", IntIp(hostinfo.hostId)).WithField("fwPacket", fwPacket).
Debugln("dropping out of window packet")
return
}
if f.firewall.Drop(out, *fwPacket, true, hostinfo, trustedCAs) {
l.WithField("vpnIp", IntIp(hostinfo.hostId)).WithField("fwPacket", fwPacket).
Debugln("dropping inbound packet")
return
}
f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo.hostId)
err = f.inside.WriteRaw(out)
if err != nil {
l.WithError(err).Error("Failed to write to tun")
}
}
func (f *Interface) sendRecvError(endpoint *udpAddr, index uint32) {
f.metricTxRecvError.Inc(1)
//TODO: this should be a signed message so we can trust that we should drop the index
b := HeaderEncode(make([]byte, HeaderLen), Version, uint8(recvError), 0, index, 0)
f.outside.WriteTo(b, endpoint)
if l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
l.WithField("index", index).
WithField("udpAddr", endpoint).
Debug("Recv error sent")
}
}
func (f *Interface) handleRecvError(addr *udpAddr, h *Header) {
f.metricRxRecvError.Inc(1)
// This flag is to stop caring about recv_error from old versions
// This should go away when the old version is gone from prod
if l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
l.WithField("index", h.RemoteIndex).
WithField("udpAddr", addr).
Debug("Recv error received")
}
hostinfo, err := f.hostMap.QueryReverseIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
if err != nil {
l.Debugln(err, ": ", h.RemoteIndex)
return
}
if !hostinfo.RecvErrorExceeded() {
return
}
if hostinfo.remote != nil && hostinfo.remote.String() != addr.String() {
l.Infoln("Someone spoofing recv_errors? ", addr, hostinfo.remote)
return
}
id := hostinfo.localIndexId
host := hostinfo.hostId
// We delete this host from the main hostmap
f.hostMap.DeleteIndex(id)
f.hostMap.DeleteVpnIP(host)
// We also delete it from pending to allow for
// fast reconnect. We must null the connectionstate
// or a counter reuse may happen
hostinfo.ConnectionState = nil
f.handshakeManager.DeleteIndex(id)
f.handshakeManager.DeleteVpnIP(host)
}
/*
func (f *Interface) sendMeta(ci *ConnectionState, endpoint *net.UDPAddr, meta *NebulaMeta) {
if ci.eKey != nil {
//TODO: log error?
return
}
msg, err := proto.Marshal(meta)
if err != nil {
l.Debugln("failed to encode header")
}
c := ci.messageCounter
b := HeaderEncode(nil, Version, uint8(metadata), 0, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, c)
ci.messageCounter++
msg := ci.eKey.EncryptDanger(b, nil, msg, c)
//msg := ci.eKey.EncryptDanger(b, nil, []byte(fmt.Sprintf("%d", counter)), c)
f.outside.WriteTo(msg, endpoint)
}
*/
func RecombineCertAndValidate(h *noise.HandshakeState, rawCertBytes []byte) (*cert.NebulaCertificate, error) {
pk := h.PeerStatic()
if pk == nil {
return nil, errors.New("no peer static key was present")
}
if rawCertBytes == nil {
return nil, errors.New("provided payload was empty")
}
r := &cert.RawNebulaCertificate{}
err := proto.Unmarshal(rawCertBytes, r)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error unmarshaling cert: %s", err)
}
// If the Details are nil, just exit to avoid crashing
if r.Details == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificate did not contain any details")
}
r.Details.PublicKey = pk
recombined, err := proto.Marshal(r)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error while recombining certificate: %s", err)
}
c, _ := cert.UnmarshalNebulaCertificate(recombined)
isValid, err := c.Verify(time.Now(), trustedCAs)
if err != nil {
return c, fmt.Errorf("certificate validation failed: %s", err)
} else if !isValid {
// This case should never happen but here's to defensive programming!
return c, errors.New("certificate validation failed but did not return an error")
}
return c, nil
}