Federalist63.txt

Federalist No. 63


The Senate Continued

For the Independent Journal.

Author: Alexander Hamilton or James Madison

To the People of the State of New York:

A FIFTH desideratum, illustrating the utility of a senate, is the want of a due
sense of national character. Without a select and stable member of the
government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an
unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already
mentioned, but the national councils will not possess that sensibility to the
opinion of the world, which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit,
than it is to obtain, its respect and confidence.

An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government
for two reasons: the one is, that, independently of the merits of any
particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it
should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy;
the second is, that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils
may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or
known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be
followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign
nations; and how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the
justice and propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously
tried by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of
mankind?

Yet however requisite a sense of national character may be, it is evident that
it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous and changeable body. It
can only be found in a number so small that a sensible degree of the praise and
blame of public measures may be the portion of each individual; or in an
assembly so durably invested with public trust, that the pride and consequence
of its members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and prosperity
of the community. The half-yearly representatives of Rhode Island would
probably have been little affected in their deliberations on the iniquitous
measures of that State, by arguments drawn from the light in which such
measures would be viewed by foreign nations, or even by the sister States;
whilst it can scarcely be doubted that if the concurrence of a select and
stable body had been necessary, a regard to national character alone would have
prevented the calamities under which that misguided people is now laboring.

I add, as a SIXTH defect the want, in some important cases, of a due
responsibility in the government to the people, arising from that frequency of
elections which in other cases produces this responsibility. This remark will,
perhaps, appear not only new, but paradoxical. It must nevertheless be
acknowledged, when explained, to be as undeniable as it is important.

Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, must be limited to objects within
the power of the responsible party, and in order to be effectual, must relate
to operations of that power, of which a ready and proper judgment can be formed
by the constituents. The objects of government may be divided into two general
classes: the one depending on measures which have singly an immediate and
sensible operation; the other depending on a succession of well-chosen and
well-connected measures, which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation.
The importance of the latter description to the collective and permanent
welfare of every country, needs no explanation. And yet it is evident that an
assembly elected for so short a term as to be unable to provide more than one
or two links in a chain of measures, on which the general welfare may
essentially depend, ought not to be answerable for the final result, any more
than a steward or tenant, engaged for one year, could be justly made to answer
for places or improvements which could not be accomplished in less than half a
dozen years. Nor is it possible for the people to estimate the SHARE of
influence which their annual assemblies may respectively have on events
resulting from the mixed transactions of several years. It is sufficiently
difficult to preserve a personal responsibility in the members of a NUMEROUS
body, for such acts of the body as have an immediate, detached, and palpable
operation on its constituents.

The proper remedy for this defect must be an additional body in the legislative
department, which, having sufficient permanency to provide for such objects as
require a continued attention, and a train of measures, may be justly and
effectually answerable for the attainment of those objects.

Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the necessity of a
well-constructed Senate only as they relate to the representatives of the
people. To a people as little blinded by prejudice or corrupted by flattery as
those whom I address, I shall not scruple to add, that such an institution may
be sometimes necessary as a defense to the people against their own temporary
errors and delusions. As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought,
in all governments, and actually will, in all free governments, ultimately
prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are particular moments in public
affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit
advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may
call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to
lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the
interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to
check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people
against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority
over the public mind? What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have
often escaped if their government had contained so provident a safeguard
against the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then have
escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock on
one day and statues on the next.

It may be suggested, that a people spread over an extensive region cannot, like
the crowded inhabitants of a small district, be subject to the infection of
violent passions, or to the danger of combining in pursuit of unjust measures.
I am far from denying that this is a distinction of peculiar importance. I
have, on the contrary, endeavored in a former paper to show, that it is one of
the principal recommendations of a confederated republic. At the same time,
this advantage ought not to be considered as superseding the use of auxiliary
precautions. It may even be remarked, that the same extended situation, which
will exempt the people of America from some of the dangers incident to lesser
republics, will expose them to the inconveniency of remaining for a longer time
under the influence of those misrepresentations which the combined industry of
interested men may succeed in distributing among them.

It adds no small weight to all these considerations, to recollect that history
informs us of no long-lived republic which had not a senate. Sparta, Rome, and
Carthage are, in fact, the only states to whom that character can be applied.
In each of the two first there was a senate for life. The constitution of the
senate in the last is less known. Circumstantial evidence makes it probable
that it was not different in this particular from the two others. It is at
least certain, that it had some quality or other which rendered it an anchor
against popular fluctuations; and that a smaller council, drawn out of the
senate, was appointed not only for life, but filled up vacancies itself. These
examples, though as unfit for the imitation, as they are repugnant to the
genius, of America, are, notwithstanding, when compared with the fugitive and
turbulent existence of other ancient republics, very instructive proofs of the
necessity of some institution that will blend stability with liberty. I am not
unaware of the circumstances which distinguish the American from other popular
governments, as well ancient as modern; and which render extreme circumspection
necessary, in reasoning from the one case to the other. But after allowing due
weight to this consideration, it may still be maintained, that there are many
points of similitude which render these examples not unworthy of our attention.
Many of the defects, as we have seen, which can only be supplied by a
senatorial institution, are common to a numerous assembly frequently elected by
the people, and to the people themselves. There are others peculiar to the
former, which require the control of such an institution. The people can never
wilfully betray their own interests; but they may possibly be betrayed by the
representatives of the people; and the danger will be evidently greater where
the whole legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men, than
where the concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every
public act.

The difference most relied on, between the American and other republics,
consists in the principle of representation; which is the pivot on which the
former move, and which is supposed to have been unknown to the latter, or at
least to the ancient part of them. The use which has been made of this
difference, in reasonings contained in former papers, will have shown that I am
disposed neither to deny its existence nor to undervalue its importance. I feel
the less restraint, therefore, in observing, that the position concerning the
ignorance of the ancient governments on the subject of representation, is by no
means precisely true in the latitude commonly given to it. Without entering
into a disquisition which here would be misplaced, I will refer to a few known
facts, in support of what I advance.

In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the executive functions were
performed, not by the people themselves, but by officers elected by the people,
and REPRESENTING the people in their EXECUTIVE capacity.

Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed by nine Archons, annually
ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE AT LARGE. The degree of power delegated to them seems to
be left in great obscurity. Subsequent to that period, we find an assembly,
first of four, and afterwards of six hundred members, annually ELECTED BY THE
PEOPLE; and PARTIALLY representing them in their LEGISLATIVE capacity, since
they were not only associated with the people in the function of making laws,
but had the exclusive right of originating legislative propositions to the
people. The senate of Carthage, also, whatever might be its power, or the
duration of its appointment, appears to have been ELECTIVE by the suffrages of
the people. Similar instances might be traced in most, if not all the popular
governments of antiquity.

Lastly, in Sparta we meet with the Ephori, and in Rome with the Tribunes; two
bodies, small indeed in numbers, but annually ELECTED BY THE WHOLE BODY OF THE
PEOPLE, and considered as the REPRESENTATIVES of the people, almost in their
PLENIPOTENTIARY capacity. The Cosmi of Crete were also annually ELECTED BY THE
PEOPLE, and have been considered by some authors as an institution analogous to
those of Sparta and Rome, with this difference only, that in the election of
that representative body the right of suffrage was communicated to a part only
of the people.

From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is clear that the
principle of representation was neither unknown to the ancients nor wholly
overlooked in their political constitutions. The true distinction between these
and the American governments, lies IN THE TOTAL EXCLUSION OF THE PEOPLE, IN
THEIR COLLECTIVE CAPACITY, from any share in the LATTER, and not in the TOTAL
EXCLUSION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE from the administration of the
FORMER. The distinction, however, thus qualified, must be admitted to leave a
most advantageous superiority in favor of the United States. But to insure to
this advantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate it from the
other advantage, of an extensive territory. For it cannot be believed, that any
form of representative government could have succeeded within the narrow limits
occupied by the democracies of Greece.

In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reason, illustrated by examples,
and enforced by our own experience, the jealous adversary of the Constitution
will probably content himself with repeating, that a senate appointed not
immediately by the people, and for the term of six years, must gradually
acquire a dangerous pre-eminence in the government, and finally transform it
into a tyrannical aristocracy.

To this general answer, the general reply ought to be sufficient, that liberty
may be endangered by the abuses of liberty as well as by the abuses of power;
that there are numerous instances of the former as well as of the latter; and
that the former, rather than the latter, are apparently most to be apprehended
by the United States. But a more particular reply may be given.

Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, it is to be observed,
must in the first place corrupt itself; must next corrupt the State
legislatures; must then corrupt the House of Representatives; and must finally
corrupt the people at large. It is evident that the Senate must be first
corrupted before it can attempt an establishment of tyranny. Without corrupting
the State legislatures, it cannot prosecute the attempt, because the periodical
change of members would otherwise regenerate the whole body. Without exerting
the means of corruption with equal success on the House of Representatives, the
opposition of that coequal branch of the government would inevitably defeat the
attempt; and without corrupting the people themselves, a succession of new
representatives would speedily restore all things to their pristine order. Is
there any man who can seriously persuade himself that the proposed Senate can,
by any possible means within the compass of human address, arrive at the object
of a lawless ambition, through all these obstructions?

If reason condemns the suspicion, the same sentence is pronounced by
experience. The constitution of Maryland furnishes the most apposite example.
The Senate of that State is elected, as the federal Senate will be, indirectly
by the people, and for a term less by one year only than the federal Senate. It
is distinguished, also, by the remarkable prerogative of filling up its own
vacancies within the term of its appointment, and, at the same time, is not
under the control of any such rotation as is provided for the federal Senate.
There are some other lesser distinctions, which would expose the former to
colorable objections, that do not lie against the latter. If the federal
Senate, therefore, really contained the danger which has been so loudly
proclaimed, some symptoms at least of a like danger ought by this time to have
been betrayed by the Senate of Maryland, but no such symptoms have appeared. On
the contrary, the jealousies at first entertained by men of the same
description with those who view with terror the correspondent part of the
federal Constitution, have been gradually extinguished by the progress of the
experiment; and the Maryland constitution is daily deriving, from the salutary
operation of this part of it, a reputation in which it will probably not be
rivalled by that of any State in the Union.

But if any thing could silence the jealousies on this subject, it ought to be
the British example. The Senate there instead of being elected for a term of
six years, and of being unconfined to particular families or fortunes, is an
hereditary assembly of opulent nobles. The House of Representatives, instead of
being elected for two years, and by the whole body of the people, is elected
for seven years, and, in very great proportion, by a very small proportion of
the people. Here, unquestionably, ought to be seen in full display the
aristocratic usurpations and tyranny which are at some future period to be
exemplified in the United States. Unfortunately, however, for the anti-federal
argument, the British history informs us that this hereditary assembly has not
been able to defend itself against the continual encroachments of the House of
Representatives; and that it no sooner lost the support of the monarch, than it
was actually crushed by the weight of the popular branch.

As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject, its examples support the
reasoning which we have employed. In Sparta, the Ephori, the annual
representatives of the people, were found an overmatch for the senate for life,
continually gained on its authority and finally drew all power into their own
hands. The Tribunes of Rome, who were the representatives of the people,
prevailed, it is well known, in almost every contest with the senate for life,
and in the end gained the most complete triumph over it. The fact is the more
remarkable, as unanimity was required in every act of the Tribunes, even after
their number was augmented to ten. It proves the irresistible force possessed
by that branch of a free government, which has the people on its side. To these
examples might be added that of Carthage, whose senate, according to the
testimony of Polybius, instead of drawing all power into its vortex, had, at
the commencement of the second Punic War, lost almost the whole of its original
portion.

Besides the conclusive evidence resulting from this assemblage of facts, that
the federal Senate will never be able to transform itself, by gradual
usurpations, into an independent and aristocratic body, we are warranted in
believing, that if such a revolution should ever happen from causes which the
foresight of man cannot guard against, the House of Representatives, with the
people on their side, will at all times be able to bring back the Constitution
to its primitive form and principles. Against the force of the immediate
representatives of the people, nothing will be able to maintain even the
constitutional authority of the Senate, but such a display of enlightened
policy, and attachment to the public good, as will divide with that branch of
the legislature the affections and support of the entire body of the people
themselves.

PUBLIUS.