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The AspNetCore Remote Authenticator for SPID Allows SAML Response Signature Verification Bypass

Critical severity GitHub Reviewed Published Feb 17, 2025 in italia/spid-aspnetcore • Updated Feb 18, 2025

Package

nuget SPID.AspNetCore.Authentication (NuGet)

Affected versions

<= 3.3.0

Patched versions

3.4.0

Description

Description

Authentication using Spid and CIE is based on the SAML2 standard which provides for two entities:

Identity Provider (IdP): the system that authenticates users and provides identity information ( SAML assertions ) to the Service Provider, essentially, it is responsible for managing user credentials and identity;
Service Provider (SP): The system that provides a service to the user and relies on the Identity Provider to authenticate the user, receives SAML assertions from the IdP to grant access to resources.
The library spid-aspnetcorerefers to the second entity, i.e. the SP, and implements the validation logic of the SAML assertions present within the SAML response . The following is a summary diagram of an authentication flow via SAML:

As shown in the diagram, the IdP, after verifying the user's credentials, generates a signed SAML response, this is propagated to the SP by the user's browser and the SP, after verifying the signature, can extract the data needed to build the user's session.

The signature validation logic is central as it ensures that you cannot craft a SAML response with arbitrary assertions and thus impersonate other users.

The following is the validation code implemented in spid-aspnetcore.

internal static bool VerifySignature(XmlDocument signedDocument, IdentityProvider? identityProvider = null){
    //...SNIP...
    SignedXml signedXml = new SignedXml(signedDocument);
    if (identityProvider is not null)
    {
        bool validated = false;
        foreach (var certificate in identityProvider.X509SigningCertificates){
            var publicMetadataCert = new X509Certificate2(Convert.FromBase64String(certificate));
            XmlNodeList nodeList = (signedDocument.GetElementsByTagName("ds:Signature")?.Count > 1) ?
                                    signedDocument.GetElementsByTagName("ds:Signature") :
                                   (signedDocument.GetElementsByTagName("ns2:Signature")?.Count > 1) ?
                                    signedDocument.GetElementsByTagName("ns2:Signature") :
                                    signedDocument.GetElementsByTagName("Signature");
            signedXml.LoadXml((XmlElement)nodeList[0]);
            validated |= signedXml.CheckSignature(publicMetadataCert, true);
        }
        return validated;
    }
    else{
        XmlNodeList nodeList = (signedDocument.GetElementsByTagName("ds:Signature")?.Count > 0) ?
                               signedDocument.GetElementsByTagName("ds:Signature") :
                               signedDocument.GetElementsByTagName("Signature");
        signedXml.LoadXml((XmlElement)nodeList[0]);
        return signedXml.CheckSignature();
    }
    //...SNIP...
}

The parameter signedDocument contains the SAML response in XML format, while the parameter identityProvider can contain the IdP info. If the parameter identityProvider has been specified, the public certificates of that IdP are extracted, so as to force their use during the signature verification, otherwise the certificates configured within the application are used.

Next, a response envelope is generated nodeList within which all XML elements containing an XML signature of part or all of the SAML response envelope are saved.

Finally, the first element of this list, i.e. the first signature found, is extracted and verified.

In a normal authentication flow, the SAML response looks like this (note that some fields and attributes have been omitted for ease of reading):

<samlp:Response ID="response_id" IssueInstant="2025-01-07T13:37:00Z" Version="2.0" xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol">
    <saml:Issuer Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity">
        https://demo.spid.gov.it/validator
    </saml:Issuer>
    <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
        <ds:SignedInfo>
            <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
            <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/>
            <ds:Reference URI="#response_id">
                <ds:Transforms>
                    <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
                </ds:Transforms>
                <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
                <ds:DigestValue>
                    <!-- DIGEST -->
                </ds:DigestValue>
            </ds:Reference>
        </ds:SignedInfo>
        <ds:SignatureValue>
           <!-- SIGNATURE -->
        </ds:SignatureValue>
        <ds:KeyInfo>
            <ds:X509Data>
                <ds:X509Certificate>
                    <!-- CERTIFICATE -->
                </ds:X509Certificate>
            </ds:X509Data>
        </ds:KeyInfo>
    </ds:Signature>
    <samlp:Status>
        <samlp:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/>
    </samlp:Status>
    <saml:Assertion ID="assertion_id" IssueInstant="2025-01-07T13:37:00Z" Version="2.0" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
        <saml:Issuer Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity">
            https://demo.spid.gov.it/validator
        </saml:Issuer>
        <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
            <ds:SignedInfo>
                <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
                <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/>
                <ds:Reference URI="#assertion_id">
                    <ds:Transforms>
                        <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
                    </ds:Transforms>
                    <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
                    <ds:DigestValue>
                        <!-- DIGEST -->
                    </ds:DigestValue>
                </ds:Reference>
            </ds:SignedInfo>
            <ds:SignatureValue>
                <!-- SIGNATURE -->
            </ds:SignatureValue>
            <ds:KeyInfo>
                <ds:X509Data>
                    <ds:X509Certificate>
                        <!-- CERTIFICATE -->
                    </ds:X509Certificate>
                </ds:X509Data>
            </ds:KeyInfo>
        </ds:Signature>
        <saml:AttributeStatement>
            <saml:Attribute Name="spidCode" NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic">
                <saml:AttributeValue xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="xs:string">
                    AGID-001
                </saml:AttributeValue>
            </saml:Attribute>
            <!-- ... SNIP ... -->
        </saml:AttributeStatement>
    </saml:Assertion>
</samlp:Response>

The SDK code would get as the first element of the nodeList, that is nodeList[0], the signature referring to the entire SAML response, in fact the reference of the first signature <ds:Reference URI="#response_id"> points to the root object <samlp:Response ID="response_id" ...>. Therefore, verifying this signature will ensure that the entire content of the SAML response is intact and authentic.

However, there is no guarantee that the first signature refers to the root object, so if an attacker injects a signed element as the first element, all other signatures will not be verified. The only requirement is to have a legitimately signed XML element from the IdP, which is easily accomplished using the public metadata of the IdP.

The SAML response would be structured like this:

Impact

An attacker could craft an arbitrary SAML response that would be accepted by SPs using the vulnerable SDKs, allowing him to impersonate any Spid and/or CIE user.

Complexity of the attack

The attacker needs an XML block containing a valid signature from one of the IdPs accepted by the SP. As described above, this requirement is satisfied by reading the public metadata of the IdP which is represented by a signed XML block of the IdP.

Related issues

N/A

PoC

  1. Clone the repository https://github.com/italia/spid-aspnetcore.git
  2. From the root of the project, enter the folder relating to the example webapp: samples/1_SimpleSPWebApp/SPID.AspNetCore.WebApp/
  3. Change the value of the AssertionConsumerServiceURL key in the file appsettings.json to a custom domain: https://$CUSTOM_DOMAIN:$CUSTOM_PORT/signin-spid
  4. Compile and run the sample webapp using the following command, taking care to replace the placeholders with the same values ​​used in step 3: dotnet build "SPID.AspNetCore.WebApp.csproj" -o ./app/build && dotnet publish "SPID.AspNetCore.WebApp.csproj" -o ./app/publish && dotnet ./app/publish/SPID.AspNetCore.WebApp.dll -urls=https://$CUSTOM_DOMAIN:$CUSTOM_PORT
  5. Visit URL: https://$CUSTOM_DOMAIN:$CUSTOM_PORT/
  6. Click "Enter with SPID" > "DemoSpid" (second IdP in the list)
  7. Visit the "Response" > "Check Response" section
  8. Insert the following string into the "Audience" field (right column): https://spid.aspnetcore.it/
  9. Click "Send response to Service Provider", note the redirect to /home/loggedin and consequently the correct execution of the login on the example portal

  1. Repeat steps 5 to 8 inclusive
  2. Intercept the HTTP request generated in step 8 via an HTTP Proxy, such as PortSwigger's BurpSuite
  3. Perform URL-decoding and Base64-decoding of the POST SAMLResponse parameter
  4. Insert the content present at the following URL in the second line of the XML: https://demo.spid.gov.it/metadata.xml
  5. Change the contents of the tag <saml:Assertion>, for example change the email attribute to an arbitrary value: [email protected]
  6. Run Base64-encoding and then URL-encoding the SAMLResponse parameter
  7. Send the request and note the redirect to /home/loggedin which demonstrates the correct identification and therefore also the verification of the arbitrary signature inserted in SAMLResponse despite the modification of the assertion

Recommended Solution

Verify all signatures within the SAML response and do not accept unsigned XML elements.

References

Credits

References

@danielegiallonardo danielegiallonardo published to italia/spid-aspnetcore Feb 17, 2025
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Feb 18, 2025
Reviewed Feb 18, 2025
Last updated Feb 18, 2025

Severity

Critical

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(12th percentile)

Weaknesses

CVE ID

CVE-2025-24894

GHSA ID

GHSA-36h8-r92j-w9vw

Source code

Credits

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