Object injection in PHPMailer/PHPMailer
Critical severity
GitHub Reviewed
Published
Apr 29, 2021
in
PHPMailer/PHPMailer
•
Updated Feb 7, 2024
Description
Published by the National Vulnerability Database
Apr 28, 2021
Reviewed
Apr 30, 2021
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
May 4, 2021
Last updated
Feb 7, 2024
Impact
This is a reintroduction of an earlier issue (CVE-2018-19296) by an unrelated bug fix in PHPMailer 6.1.8. An external file may be unexpectedly executable if it is used as a path to an attachment file via PHP's support for
.phar
files`. Exploitation requires that an attacker is able to provide an unfiltered path to a file to attach, or to trick calling code into generating one. See this article for more info.Patches
This issue was patched in the PHPMailer 6.4.1 release. This release also implements stricter filtering for attachment paths; paths that look like any kind of URL are rejected.
Workarounds
Validate paths to loaded files using the same pattern as used in
isPermittedPath()
before using them in any PHP file function, such asfile_exists
. This method can't be used directly because it is protected, but you can implement the same thing in calling code. Note that this should be applied to all user-supplied paths passed into such functions; it's not a problem specific to PHPMailer.Credit
This issue was found by Fariskhi Vidyan, reported and managed via Tidelift.
References