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CI: Harden GHA configuration #102
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This eliminates the possibility of a tag being changed under us.
This eliminates the possibility of a tag being changed under us.
May include: - Avoids risky string interpolation. - Prevents checkout premissions from leaking
Reduces risk of arbitrary code is run by attacker.
Reduces risk of arbitrary code is run by attacker.
@@ -5,8 +5,13 @@ on: [push, pull_request] | |||
jobs: | |||
build: | |||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest | |||
permissions: | |||
contents: write | |||
|
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steps: | |||
- uses: actions/checkout@v4 |
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Not pinned.
.github/workflows/codeql.yml
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No actions are pinned in this file.
The tool I used to find un-pinned actions (zizmor) does not flag the "official" I suspect the logic is if someone manages to compromise GH there are more direct ways to cause trouble than funny side-band attacks via GHA. |
Co-authored-by: Elliott Sales de Andrade <[email protected]>
I think you need to run with the pedantic persona to catch those. |
Apply recommended hardening steps including: