[ALPS06486924] ACK: Merge android-4.19-stable into alps-mp-s0.mp1

Target:
   android-4.19-stable "011b73c995f35959b39ccde045addbc1862fa3e6
   Merge 4.19.191 into android-4.19-stable"

Version change from 4.19.188 to 4.19.191

MTK-Commit-Id: c8384f99d5a155550b3c0707800ea3d1d83f9ee3

Feature: Kernel SI Operation
CR-Id: ALPS06486924
Signed-off-by: Bo Ye <[email protected]>
Change-Id: Ic51822fa66c2d94e5f60b2e65a65153ade20c228

Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst

@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ automatically verified against the file's Merkle tree.  Reads of any
 corrupted data, including mmap reads, will fail.
 
 Userspace can use another ioctl to retrieve the root hash (actually
-the "file measurement", which is a hash that includes the root hash)
-that fs-verity is enforcing for the file.  This ioctl executes in
-constant time, regardless of the file size.
+the "fs-verity file digest", which is a hash that includes the Merkle
+tree root hash) that fs-verity is enforcing for the file.  This ioctl
+executes in constant time, regardless of the file size.
 
 fs-verity is essentially a way to hash a file in constant time,
 subject to the caveat that reads which would violate the hash will
@@ -177,9 +177,10 @@ FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY can fail with the following errors:
 FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY
 ---------------------
 
-The FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl retrieves the measurement of a verity
-file.  The file measurement is a digest that cryptographically
-identifies the file contents that are being enforced on reads.
+The FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl retrieves the digest of a verity file.
+The fs-verity file digest is a cryptographic digest that identifies
+the file contents that are being enforced on reads; it is computed via
+a Merkle tree and is different from a traditional full-file digest.
 
 This ioctl takes in a pointer to a variable-length structure::
 
@@ -197,7 +198,7 @@ On success, 0 is returned and the kernel fills in the structure as
 follows:
 
 - ``digest_algorithm`` will be the hash algorithm used for the file
-  measurement.  It will match ``fsverity_enable_arg::hash_algorithm``.
+  digest.  It will match ``fsverity_enable_arg::hash_algorithm``.
 - ``digest_size`` will be the size of the digest in bytes, e.g. 32
   for SHA-256.  (This can be redundant with ``digest_algorithm``.)
 - ``digest`` will be the actual bytes of the digest.
@@ -257,25 +258,24 @@ non-verity one, with the following exceptions:
   with EIO (for read()) or SIGBUS (for mmap() reads).
 
 - If the sysctl "fs.verity.require_signatures" is set to 1 and the
-  file's verity measurement is not signed by a key in the fs-verity
-  keyring, then opening the file will fail.  See `Built-in signature
-  verification`_.
+  file is not signed by a key in the fs-verity keyring, then opening
+  the file will fail.  See `Built-in signature verification`_.
 
 Direct access to the Merkle tree is not supported.  Therefore, if a
 verity file is copied, or is backed up and restored, then it will lose
 its "verity"-ness.  fs-verity is primarily meant for files like
 executables that are managed by a package manager.
 
-File measurement computation
-============================
+File digest computation
+=======================
 
 This section describes how fs-verity hashes the file contents using a
-Merkle tree to produce the "file measurement" which cryptographically
-identifies the file contents.  This algorithm is the same for all
-filesystems that support fs-verity.
+Merkle tree to produce the digest which cryptographically identifies
+the file contents.  This algorithm is the same for all filesystems
+that support fs-verity.
 
 Userspace only needs to be aware of this algorithm if it needs to
-compute the file measurement itself, e.g. in order to sign the file.
+compute fs-verity file digests itself, e.g. in order to sign files.
 
 .. _fsverity_merkle_tree:
 
@@ -325,26 +325,22 @@ can't a distinguish a large file from a small second file whose data
 is exactly the top-level hash block of the first file.  Ambiguities
 also arise from the convention of padding to the next block boundary.
 
-To solve this problem, the verity file measurement is actually
-computed as a hash of the following structure, which contains the
-Merkle tree root hash as well as other fields such as the file size::
+To solve this problem, the fs-verity file digest is actually computed
+as a hash of the following structure, which contains the Merkle tree
+root hash as well as other fields such as the file size::
 
     struct fsverity_descriptor {
             __u8 version;           /* must be 1 */
             __u8 hash_algorithm;    /* Merkle tree hash algorithm */
             __u8 log_blocksize;     /* log2 of size of data and tree blocks */
             __u8 salt_size;         /* size of salt in bytes; 0 if none */
-            __le32 sig_size;        /* must be 0 */
+            __le32 __reserved_0x04; /* must be 0 */
             __le64 data_size;       /* size of file the Merkle tree is built over */
             __u8 root_hash[64];     /* Merkle tree root hash */
             __u8 salt[32];          /* salt prepended to each hashed block */
             __u8 __reserved[144];   /* must be 0's */
     };
 
-Note that the ``sig_size`` field must be set to 0 for the purpose of
-computing the file measurement, even if a signature was provided (or
-will be provided) to `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_.
-
 Built-in signature verification
 ===============================
 
@@ -359,20 +355,20 @@ kernel.  Specifically, it adds support for:
    certificates from being added.
 
 2. `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_ accepts a pointer to a PKCS#7 formatted
-   detached signature in DER format of the file measurement.  On
-   success, this signature is persisted alongside the Merkle tree.
+   detached signature in DER format of the file's fs-verity digest.
+   On success, this signature is persisted alongside the Merkle tree.
    Then, any time the file is opened, the kernel will verify the
-   file's actual measurement against this signature, using the
-   certificates in the ".fs-verity" keyring.
+   file's actual digest against this signature, using the certificates
+   in the ".fs-verity" keyring.
 
 3. A new sysctl "fs.verity.require_signatures" is made available.
    When set to 1, the kernel requires that all verity files have a
-   correctly signed file measurement as described in (2).
+   correctly signed digest as described in (2).
 
-File measurements must be signed in the following format, which is
-similar to the structure used by `FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY`_::
+fs-verity file digests must be signed in the following format, which
+is similar to the structure used by `FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY`_::
 
-    struct fsverity_signed_digest {
+    struct fsverity_formatted_digest {
             char magic[8];                  /* must be "FSVerity" */
             __le16 digest_algorithm;
             __le16 digest_size;
@@ -421,8 +417,8 @@ can only be set by `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_, and it cannot be cleared.
 
 ext4 also supports encryption, which can be used simultaneously with
 fs-verity.  In this case, the plaintext data is verified rather than
-the ciphertext.  This is necessary in order to make the file
-measurement meaningful, since every file is encrypted differently.
+the ciphertext.  This is necessary in order to make the fs-verity file
+digest meaningful, since every file is encrypted differently.
 
 ext4 stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor)
 past the end of the file, starting at the first 64K boundary beyond
@@ -592,8 +588,8 @@ weren't already directly answered in other parts of this document.
 :Q: Isn't fs-verity useless because the attacker can just modify the
     hashes in the Merkle tree, which is stored on-disk?
 :A: To verify the authenticity of an fs-verity file you must verify
-    the authenticity of the "file measurement", which is basically the
-    root hash of the Merkle tree.  See `Use cases`_.
+    the authenticity of the "fs-verity file digest", which
+    incorporates the root hash of the Merkle tree.  See `Use cases`_.
 
 :Q: Isn't fs-verity useless because the attacker can just replace a
     verity file with a non-verity one?

Documentation/sphinx/parse-headers.pl

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/usr/bin/perl
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
 use strict;
 use Text::Tabs;
 use Getopt::Long;

Documentation/target/tcm_mod_builder.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/usr/bin/python
+#!/usr/bin/env python
 # The TCM v4 multi-protocol fabric module generation script for drivers/target/$NEW_MOD
 #
 # Copyright (c) 2010 Rising Tide Systems

Documentation/trace/postprocess/decode_msr.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/usr/bin/python
+#!/usr/bin/env python
 # add symbolic names to read_msr / write_msr in trace
 # decode_msr msr-index.h < trace
 import sys

Documentation/trace/postprocess/trace-pagealloc-postprocess.pl

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/usr/bin/perl
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
 # This is a POC (proof of concept or piece of crap, take your pick) for reading the
 # text representation of trace output related to page allocation. It makes an attempt
 # to extract some high-level information on what is going on. The accuracy of the parser

Documentation/trace/postprocess/trace-vmscan-postprocess.pl

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/usr/bin/perl
+#!/usr/bin/env perl
 # This is a POC for reading the text representation of trace output related to
 # page reclaim. It makes an attempt to extract some high-level information on
 # what is going on. The accuracy of the parser may vary

Makefile

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 4
 PATCHLEVEL = 19
-SUBLEVEL = 188
+SUBLEVEL = 191
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = "People's Front"