[ALPS05525109] [Do NOT Sync]Merge branch android-4.19-stable into alp…

…s-trunk-s0.basic

[Detail]
	Target: a175946

MTK-Commit-Id: 2765eae88b32b52fa0e8d892ec7b1b897550f4a1

Feature: Others
Change-Id: Ia70d9ce11c361253362a469134bd0642b7f7dee6
CR-Id: ALPS05525109
Signed-off-by: Breeze Li <[email protected]>

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio

@@ -1559,7 +1559,8 @@ What:		/sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_concentrationX_voc_raw
 KernelVersion:	4.3
 Contact:	[email protected]
 Description:
-		Raw (unscaled no offset etc.) percentage reading of a substance.
+		Raw (unscaled no offset etc.) reading of a substance. Units
+		after application of scale and offset are percents.
 
 What:		/sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_resistance_raw
 What:		/sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_resistanceX_raw

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu

@@ -478,6 +478,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
 Date:		January 2018

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-fs-f2fs

@@ -333,6 +333,15 @@ Description:	Give a way to attach REQ_META|FUA to data writes
 		*    5 |    4 |   3 |    2 |    1 |   0 |
 		* Cold | Warm | Hot | Cold | Warm | Hot |
 
+What:		/sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/node_io_flag
+Date:		June 2020
+Contact:	"Jaegeuk Kim" <[email protected]>
+Description:	Give a way to attach REQ_META|FUA to node writes
+		given temperature-based bits. Now the bits indicate:
+		*      REQ_META     |      REQ_FUA      |
+		*    5 |    4 |   3 |    2 |    1 |   0 |
+		* Cold | Warm | Hot | Cold | Warm | Hot |
+
 What:		/sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/iostat_period_ms
 Date:		April 2020
 Contact:	"Daeho Jeong" <[email protected]>

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst

@@ -14,3 +14,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    mds
    tsx_async_abort
    multihit.rst
+   special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+SRBDS - Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+=============================================
+
+SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows MDS :doc:`mds` techniques to
+infer values returned from special register accesses.  Special register
+accesses are accesses to off core registers.  According to Intel's evaluation,
+the special register reads that have a security expectation of privacy are
+RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY.
+
+When RDRAND, RDSEED and EGETKEY instructions are used, the data is moved
+to the core through the special register mechanism that is susceptible
+to MDS attacks.
+
+Affected processors
+--------------------
+Core models (desktop, mobile, Xeon-E3) that implement RDRAND and/or RDSEED may
+be affected.
+
+A processor is affected by SRBDS if its Family_Model and stepping is
+in the following list, with the exception of the listed processors
+exporting MDS_NO while Intel TSX is available yet not enabled. The
+latter class of processors are only affected when Intel TSX is enabled
+by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise they are not affected.
+
+  =============  ============  ========
+  common name    Family_Model  Stepping
+  =============  ============  ========
+  IvyBridge      06_3AH        All
+
+  Haswell        06_3CH        All
+  Haswell_L      06_45H        All
+  Haswell_G      06_46H        All
+
+  Broadwell_G    06_47H        All
+  Broadwell      06_3DH        All
+
+  Skylake_L      06_4EH        All
+  Skylake        06_5EH        All
+
+  Kabylake_L     06_8EH        <= 0xC
+  Kabylake       06_9EH        <= 0xD
+  =============  ============  ========
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this SRBDS issue:
+
+    ==============  =====  =====================================
+    CVE-2020-0543   SRBDS  Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+    ==============  =====  =====================================
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+An unprivileged user can extract values returned from RDRAND and RDSEED
+executed on another core or sibling thread using MDS techniques.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------
+Intel will release microcode updates that modify the RDRAND, RDSEED, and
+EGETKEY instructions to overwrite secret special register data in the shared
+staging buffer before the secret data can be accessed by another logical
+processor.
+
+During execution of the RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions, off-core
+accesses from other logical processors will be delayed until the special
+register read is complete and the secret data in the shared staging buffer is
+overwritten.
+
+This has three effects on performance:
+
+#. RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions have higher latency.
+
+#. Executing RDRAND at the same time on multiple logical processors will be
+   serialized, resulting in an overall reduction in the maximum RDRAND
+   bandwidth.
+
+#. Executing RDRAND, RDSEED or EGETKEY will delay memory accesses from other
+   logical processors that miss their core caches, with an impact similar to
+   legacy locked cache-line-split accesses.
+
+The microcode updates provide an opt-out mechanism (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to disable
+the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions executed outside of Intel
+Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) enclaves. On logical processors that
+disable the mitigation using this opt-out mechanism, RDRAND and RDSEED do not
+take longer to execute and do not impact performance of sibling logical
+processors memory accesses. The opt-out mechanism does not affect Intel SGX
+enclaves (including execution of RDRAND or RDSEED inside an enclave, as well
+as EGETKEY execution).
+
+IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR Definition
+--------------------------------
+Along with the mitigation for this issue, Intel added a new thread-scope
+IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR, (address 0x123). The presence of this MSR and
+RNGDS_MITG_DIS (bit 0) is enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0).EDX[SRBDS_CTRL =
+9]==1. This MSR is introduced through the microcode update.
+
+Setting IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[0] (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to 1 for a logical processor
+disables the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED executed outside of an Intel SGX
+enclave on that logical processor. Opting out of the mitigation for a
+particular logical processor does not affect the RDRAND and RDSEED mitigations
+for other logical processors.
+
+Note that inside of an Intel SGX enclave, the mitigation is applied regardless
+of the value of RNGDS_MITG_DS.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+The kernel command line allows control over the SRBDS mitigation at boot time
+with the option "srbds=".  The option for this is:
+
+  ============= =============================================================
+  off           This option disables SRBDS mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED on
+                affected platforms.
+  ============= =============================================================
+
+SRBDS System Information
+-----------------------
+The Linux kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs.  For
+SRBDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
+
+The possible values contained in this file are:
+
+ ============================== =============================================
+ Not affected                   Processor not vulnerable
+ Vulnerable                     Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled
+ Vulnerable: No microcode       Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
+                                mitigation
+ Mitigation: Microcode          Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
+                                effect.
+ Mitigation: TSX disabled       Processor is only vulnerable when TSX is
+                                enabled while this system was booted with TSX
+                                disabled.
+ Unknown: Dependent on
+ hypervisor status              Running on virtual guest processor that is
+                                affected but with no way to know if host
+                                processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
+ ============================== =============================================
+
+SRBDS Default mitigation
+------------------------
+This new microcode serializes processor access during execution of RDRAND,
+RDSEED ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for
+reuse.  Use the "srbds=off" kernel command line to disable the mitigation for
+RDRAND and RDSEED.

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -490,10 +490,14 @@
 			cut the overhead, others just disable the usage. So
 			only cgroup_disable=memory is actually worthy}
 
-	cgroup_no_v1=	[KNL] Disable one, multiple, all cgroup controllers in v1
-			Format: { controller[,controller...] | "all" }
+	cgroup_no_v1=	[KNL] Disable cgroup controllers and named hierarchies in v1
+			Format: { { controller | "all" | "named" }
+			          [,{ controller | "all" | "named" }...] }
 			Like cgroup_disable, but only applies to cgroup v1;
 			the blacklisted controllers remain available in cgroup2.
+			"all" blacklists all controllers and "named" disables
+			named mounts. Specifying both "all" and "named" disables
+			all v1 hierarchies.
 
 	cgroup.memory=	[KNL] Pass options to the cgroup memory controller.
 			Format: <string>
@@ -558,7 +562,7 @@
 			loops can be debugged more effectively on production
 			systems.
 
-	clearcpuid=BITNUM [X86]
+	clearcpuid=BITNUM[,BITNUM...] [X86]
 			Disable CPUID feature X for the kernel. See
 			arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h for the valid bit
 			numbers. Note the Linux specific bits are not necessarily
@@ -2569,6 +2573,8 @@
 					       mds=off [X86]
 					       tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
 					       kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86]
+					       no_entry_flush [PPC]
+					       no_uaccess_flush [PPC]
 
 				Exceptions:
 					       This does not have any effect on
@@ -2879,6 +2885,8 @@
 
 	noefi		Disable EFI runtime services support.
 
+	no_entry_flush  [PPC] Don't flush the L1-D cache when entering the kernel.
+
 	noexec		[IA-64]
 
 	noexec		[X86]
@@ -2928,6 +2936,9 @@
 	nospec_store_bypass_disable
 			[HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability
 
+	no_uaccess_flush
+	                [PPC] Don't flush the L1-D cache after accessing user data.
+
 	noxsave		[BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save
 			and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to
 			enabling legacy floating-point and sse state.
@@ -4436,6 +4447,26 @@
 	spia_pedr=
 	spia_peddr=
 
+	srbds=		[X86,INTEL]
+			Control the Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+			(SRBDS) mitigation.
+
+			Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an MDS-like
+			exploit which can leak bits from the random
+			number generator.
+
+			By default, this issue is mitigated by
+			microcode.  However, the microcode fix can cause
+			the RDRAND and RDSEED instructions to become
+			much slower.  Among other effects, this will
+			result in reduced throughput from /dev/urandom.
+
+			The microcode mitigation can be disabled with
+			the following option:
+
+			off:    Disable mitigation and remove
+				performance impact to RDRAND and RDSEED
+
 	srcutree.counter_wrap_check [KNL]
 			Specifies how frequently to check for
 			grace-period sequence counter wrap for the
@@ -5271,6 +5302,14 @@
 			with /sys/devices/system/xen_memory/xen_memory0/scrub_pages.
 			Default value controlled with CONFIG_XEN_SCRUB_PAGES_DEFAULT.
 
+	xen.event_eoi_delay=	[XEN]
+			How long to delay EOI handling in case of event
+			storms (jiffies). Default is 10.
+
+	xen.event_loop_timeout=	[XEN]
+			After which time (jiffies) the event handling loop
+			should start to delay EOI handling. Default is 2.
+
 	xirc2ps_cs=	[NET,PCMCIA]
 			Format:
 			<irq>,<irq_mask>,<io>,<full_duplex>,<do_sound>,<lockup_hack>[,<irq2>[,<irq3>[,<irq4>]]]

Documentation/core-api/timekeeping.rst

@@ -99,16 +99,20 @@ Coarse and fast_ns access
 
 Some additional variants exist for more specialized cases:
 
-.. c:function:: ktime_t ktime_get_coarse_boottime( void )
+.. c:function:: ktime_t ktime_get_coarse( void )
+		ktime_t ktime_get_coarse_boottime( void )
 		ktime_t ktime_get_coarse_real( void )
 		ktime_t ktime_get_coarse_clocktai( void )
-		ktime_t ktime_get_coarse_raw( void )
+
+.. c:function:: u64 ktime_get_coarse_ns( void )
+		u64 ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ns( void )
+		u64 ktime_get_coarse_real_ns( void )
+		u64 ktime_get_coarse_clocktai_ns( void )
 
 .. c:function:: void ktime_get_coarse_ts64( struct timespec64 * )
 		void ktime_get_coarse_boottime_ts64( struct timespec64 * )
 		void ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64( struct timespec64 * )
 		void ktime_get_coarse_clocktai_ts64( struct timespec64 * )
-		void ktime_get_coarse_raw_ts64( struct timespec64 * )
 
 	These are quicker than the non-coarse versions, but less accurate,
 	corresponding to CLOCK_MONONOTNIC_COARSE and CLOCK_REALTIME_COARSE

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/mediatek/mediatek,dpi.txt

@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ Required properties:
   Documentation/devicetree/bindings/graph.txt. This port should be connected
   to the input port of an attached HDMI or LVDS encoder chip.
 
+Optional properties:
+- pinctrl-names: Contain "default" and "sleep".
+
 Example:
 
 dpi0: dpi@1401d000 {
@@ -26,6 +29,9 @@ dpi0: dpi@1401d000 {
 		 <&mmsys CLK_MM_DPI_ENGINE>,
 		 <&apmixedsys CLK_APMIXED_TVDPLL>;
 	clock-names = "pixel", "engine", "pll";
+	pinctrl-names = "default", "sleep";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&dpi_pin_func>;
+	pinctrl-1 = <&dpi_pin_idle>;
 
 	port {
 		dpi0_out: endpoint {

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/multiplexer/io-channel-mux.txt

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ controller state. The mux controller state is described in
 
 Example:
 	mux: mux-controller {
-		compatible = "mux-gpio";
+		compatible = "gpio-mux";
 		#mux-control-cells = <0>;
 
 		mux-gpios = <&pioA 0 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>,

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/nxp-nci.txt

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Example (for ARM-based BeagleBone with NPC100 NFC controller on I2C2):
 		clock-frequency = <100000>;
 
 		interrupt-parent = <&gpio1>;
-		interrupts = <29 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+		interrupts = <29 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 
 		enable-gpios = <&gpio0 30 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 		firmware-gpios = <&gpio0 31 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/pn544.txt

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Example (for ARM-based BeagleBone with PN544 on I2C2):
 		clock-frequency = <400000>;
 
 		interrupt-parent = <&gpio1>;
-		interrupts = <17 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+		interrupts = <17 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 
 		enable-gpios = <&gpio3 21 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 		firmware-gpios = <&gpio3 19 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/wm8994.txt

@@ -14,9 +14,15 @@ Required properties:
   - #gpio-cells : Must be 2. The first cell is the pin number and the
     second cell is used to specify optional parameters (currently unused).
 
-  - AVDD2-supply, DBVDD1-supply, DBVDD2-supply, DBVDD3-supply, CPVDD-supply,
-    SPKVDD1-supply, SPKVDD2-supply : power supplies for the device, as covered
-    in Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/regulator.txt
+  - power supplies for the device, as covered in
+    Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/regulator.txt, depending
+    on compatible:
+    - for wlf,wm1811 and wlf,wm8958:
+      AVDD1-supply, AVDD2-supply, DBVDD1-supply, DBVDD2-supply, DBVDD3-supply,
+      DCVDD-supply, CPVDD-supply, SPKVDD1-supply, SPKVDD2-supply
+    - for wlf,wm8994:
+      AVDD1-supply, AVDD2-supply, DBVDD-supply, DCVDD-supply, CPVDD-supply,
+      SPKVDD1-supply, SPKVDD2-supply
 
 Optional properties:
 
@@ -73,11 +79,11 @@ wm8994: codec@1a {
 
 	lineout1-se;
 
+	AVDD1-supply = <&regulator>;
 	AVDD2-supply = <&regulator>;
 	CPVDD-supply = <&regulator>;
-	DBVDD1-supply = <&regulator>;
-	DBVDD2-supply = <&regulator>;
-	DBVDD3-supply = <&regulator>;
+	DBVDD-supply = <&regulator>;
+	DCVDD-supply = <&regulator>;
 	SPKVDD1-supply = <&regulator>;
 	SPKVDD2-supply = <&regulator>;
 };

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/usb/dwc3.txt

@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ Optional properties:
 			from P0 to P1/P2/P3 without delay.
  - snps,dis-tx-ipgap-linecheck-quirk: when set, disable u2mac linestate check
 			during HS transmit.
+ - snps,parkmode-disable-ss-quirk: when set, all SuperSpeed bus instances in
+			park mode are disabled.
  - snps,dis_metastability_quirk: when set, disable metastability workaround.
 			CAUTION: use only if you are absolutely sure of it.
  - snps,is-utmi-l1-suspend: true when DWC3 asserts output signal