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Failed_ideas
The idea of limit courts was wrong:
First I (Victor Porton) "invented" to limit amount of transferred tokens through an intercourt trust relation (to limit the amount of trust). But then I found that a hacker can quickly diminish the limits by transferring back-and-forth multiple times. Then I "invented" so-called limit courts that is "wrappers" around a court that limit the amount of money transferred out through it. I thought it solves this security vulnerability, but later found that transfer back-and-forth to/from a limit courts has the same problem: the limits can be diminished by a hacker.
So I declined the idea of setting monetary limits in intercourt trust. Instead the trust should be always "full" (for arbitrary amount of money).
Henceforth, I came up with a better idea how to do non-trusted intercourt transfers. (District courts would 100% trust the supreme court but not vice versa.) Intercourt transfers should be done by a trusted court controlled by a special entity (often a smart contract) that does exchange of a token by a token minted by the trusted court.
This approach has advantages over hard limiting of intercourt transfer amounts:
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We can do something to solve the circular transfer by a hacker problem.
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We can do something other than hard numeric limits. For example, we can decrease the value of an exchanged token when it is nearing a (soft) limit rather than setting a hard limit.
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We can exchange tokens (or ETH) from outside of our court system.
TODO: Explain the above better.